Ten pilot-to-decision episodes across India and Singapore, from interviews with CVC managers, accelerator leads, corporate sponsors and founders. I defined Corporate MIA as the failure to name an owner, commit budget, or reach a documented go/no-go decision within 90 days of a programme ending, then tested what predicts it.
Finding 1. Accountability beats enthusiasm
I scored each episode on four mechanisms: a named owner, a budget pathway, a
decision timeline, and an escalation protocol. The relationship with outcome was the
cleanest in the dataset.
4 of 4 mechanisms
0%
72-day decisions
Share of episodes that went MIA, by accountability mechanisms in place. Labels show average time to a documented decision.
Every episode carrying three or four mechanisms reached a decision inside 90 days. Every episode
carrying none went MIA. Enthusiasm at demo day predicted nothing.
Finding 2. The diagnosis is usually wrong before the work starts
Building on Hunt et al. (2023), I coded two fields per episode: the knowledge problem the sponsor stated at
the outset, and the one that actually blocked the deal, across ambiguity, complexity, uncertainty and
equivocality. The mismatch pairing predicted the outcome better than sector, stage or programme size.
Complexity → Equivocality
100%
n=3 · 180+ days
Uncertainty → Complexity
50%
n=2 · 145 days
Complexity → Complexity
0%
n=2 · 71 days
Equivocality → Equivocality
0%
n=1 · 85 days
Other aligned pairings
0%
n=2 · 68 days
MIA rate by perceived-to-actual knowledge-problem pairing.
The killer is C→E: a sponsor treats the deal as an integration problem that tooling
will solve, when the real blocker is unresolved internal disagreement about priorities and risk ownership. In one
episode the pilot succeeded technically and still took 180 days, because the business unit wanted speed, global IT
wanted data-security assurance, and legal wanted cross-border compliance, and nobody owned the tradeoff.
As one respondent put it: “accelerators create access, accountability creates adoption.”
Finding 3. Who runs the programme changes the follow-through
| Programme model | Focus | n | MIA rate | Avg decision | Pilot or investment |
|---|
| In-house | Vertical | 3 | 0% | 78 days | 100% |
| In-house | Horizontal | 2 | 0% | 95 days | 100% |
| Powered-by | Vertical | 2 | 50% | 128 days | 50% |
| Powered-by | Horizontal | 3 | 67% | 165 days | 33% |
Finding 4. Control rights work, but only alongside accountability
| Control rights | n | MIA rate | Avg decision | Follow-through index |
|---|
| CVC equity ≥ 7% plus board seat | 2 | 0% | 74 days | 8.5 / 9 |
| CVC equity < 7% plus observer seat | 3 | 0% | 92 days | 7.0 / 9 |
| CVC equity only, no seat | 2 | 50% | 118 days | 5.5 / 9 |
| No CVC involvement | 3 | 67% | 156 days | 3.0 / 9 |
Equity alone did not hold a corporate to a decision. Equity plus a seat plus a named owner did.
What I built
A coding framework pairing perceived against actual knowledge problems across 16 combinations, an accountability
architecture scored 0 to 4, and a composite follow-through index scored 0 to 9 for rating how likely a
corporate is to act after a programme ends. Validity was handled through triangulation across founder, sponsor and
programme-manager accounts, member checking with two to three informants per country, and a documented chain of
evidence from transcript to code to conclusion.
Ten episodes, qualitative. These are patterns from a small sample, not population statistics: the subgroup rates rest on two or three cases each. Graded A. Full paper available on request.